We identify and fill some gaps with regard to consistency (the extent to which false positives are produced) for public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS). We define computational and statistical relaxations of the existing notion of perfect consistency, show that the scheme of [7] is computationally consistent, and provide a new scheme that is statistically consistent. We also provide a transform of an anonymous IBE scheme to a secure PEKS scheme that, unlike the previous one, guarantees consistency. Finally we suggest three extensions of the basic notions considered here, namely anonymous HIBE, public-key encryption with temporary keyword search, and identity-based encryption with keyword search.
Introduction
There has recently been interest in various forms of "searchable encryption" [20, 7, 13, 15, 22] . In this paper, we further explore one of the variants of this goal, namely public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) as introduced by Boneh, Di Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Persiano [7] . We begin by discussing consistency-related issues and results, then consider the connection to anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE) and finally discuss some extensions.
Consistency in PEKS
Any cryptographic primitive must meet two conditions. One is of course a security condition. The other, which we will here call a consistency condition, ensures that the primitive fulfills its function. For example, for public-key encryption, the security condition is privacy. (This could be formalized in many ways, eg. IND-CPA or IND-CCA.) The consistency condition is that decryption reverses encryption, meaning that if M is encrypted under public key pk to result in ciphertext C, then decrypting C under the secret key corresponding to pk results in M being returned.
PEKS. In a PEKS scheme, Alice can provide a gateway with a trapdoor t w (computed as a function of her secret key) for any keyword w of her choice. A sender encrypts a keyword w under Alice's public key pk to obtain a ciphertext C that is sent to the gateway. The latter can apply a test function Test to t w , C to get back 0 or 1. The consistency condition as per [7] is that if w = w then Test(t w , C) returns 1 and if w = w it returns 0. The security condition is that the gateway learn nothing about w beyond whether or not it equals w . (The corresponding formal notion will be denoted PEKS-IND-CPA.) The application setting is that C can be attached to an email (ordinarily encrypted for Alice under a different public key), allowing the gateway to route the email to different locations (eg. Alice's desktop, laptop or pager) based on w while preserving privacy of the latter to the largest extent possible.
Consistency of BDOP -PEKS .
It is easy to see (cf. Proposition 3.1) that the main construction of [7] (a random oracle model, BDH-based PEKS-IND-CPA secure PEKS scheme that we call BDOP -PEKS ) fails to meet the consistency condition defined in [7] and stated above. (Specifically, there are distinct keywords w , w such that Test(t w , C) = 1 for any C that encrypts w .) The potential problem this raises in practice is that email will be incorrectly routed.
New notions of consistency. It is natural to ask if BDOP -PEKS meets some consistency condition that is weaker than theirs but still adequate in practice. To answer this, we provide some new definitions. Somewhat unusually for a consistency condition, we formulate consistency more like a security condition, via an experiment involving an adversary. The difference is that this adversary is not very "adversarial": it is supposed to reflect some kind of worst case but not malicious behavior. However this turns out to be a difficult line to draw, definitionally, so that some subtle issues arise. One outcome of this approach is that it naturally gives rise to a hierarchy of notions of consistency, namely perfect, statistical and computational. The first asks that the advantage of any (even computationally unbounded) adversary be zero; the second that the advantage of any (even computationally unbounded) adversary be negligible; the third that the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary be negligible. We note that perfect consistency as per our definition coincides with consistency as per [7] , and so our notions can be viewed as natural weakenings of theirs.
An analogy. There is a natural notion of decryption error for encryption schemes [14, Section 5.1.2] . A perfectly consistent PEKS is the analog of an encryption scheme with zero decryption error (the usual requirement). A statistically consistent PEKS is the analog of an encryption scheme with negligible decryption error (a less common but still often used condition [1, 11] ). However, computational Anonymous IBE schemes. The above motivates finding anonymous IBE schemes. Towards this, we begin by extending Halevi's condition for anonymity [16] to the IBE setting (cf. Section 4.4). Based on this, we are able to give a simple proof that the (random-oracle model) BF -IBE scheme [8] is IBE-ANO-CPA assuming the BDH problem is hard (cf. Theorem 4.4). (We clarify that a proof of this result is implicit in the proof of security of the BF -IBE based BDOP -PEKS scheme given in [7] . Our contribution is to have stated the formal definition of anonymity and provided a simpler proof via the extension of Halevi's condition.) Towards answering the question of whether there exist anonymous IBE schemes in the standard (as opposed to random oracle) model, we present in Appendix B.1 an attack to show that Water's IBE scheme [21] is not IBE-ANO-CPA.
Extensions
Anonymous HIBE. We provide definitions of anonymity for hierarchical IBE (HIBE) schemes. Our definition can be parameterized by a level, so that we can talk of a HIBE that is anonymous at level l. We note that the HIBE schemes of [12, 6] are not anonymous, even at level 1. (That of [17] appears to be anonymous at both levels 1 and 2 but is very limited in nature and thus turns out not to be useful for our applications.) We modify the construction of Gentry and Silverberg [12] to obtain a HIBE that is (HIBE-IND-CPA and) anonymous at level 1. The construction is in the random oracle model and assumes BDH is hard.
PETKS. In a PEKS scheme, once the gateway has the trapdoor for a certain period, it can test whether this keyword was present in any past ciphertexts or future ciphertexts. It may be useful to limit the period in which the trapdoor can be used. Here we propose an extension of PEKS that we call public-key encryption with temporary keyword search (PETKS) that allows this. A trapdoor here is created for a time interval [s..e] and will only allow the gateway to test whether ciphertexts created in this time interval contain the keyword. We provide definitions of privacy and consistency for PETKS, and then show how to implement it with overhead that is only logarithmic in the total number of time periods. Our construction can use any HIBE that is anonymous at level 1. Using the above-mentioned HIBE we get a particular instantiation that is secure in the random-oracle model if BDH is hard.
IBEKS.
We define the notion of an identity-based encryption with keyword search scheme. This is just like a PEKS scheme except that encryption is performed given only the identity of the receiver and a master public-key, just like in an IBE scheme. We show how to implement IBEKS given any level-2 anonymous HIBE scheme. However no suitable implementation of the latter is known, so we have no concrete implementation of IBEKS.
Remarks
bdop-peks-2-ibe. Boneh et. al. [7] showed how to transform a PEKS-IND-CPA PEKS scheme into an IBE-IND-CPA IBE scheme. We remark that their transform requires the starting PEKS scheme to be perfectly consistent. (But no perfectly consistent schemes are known to date.) If it is only statistically or computationally consistent, the resulting IBE scheme will only meet a corresponding statistical or computational relaxation of the consistency condition for IBE schemes. (And thus not be an IBE scheme as per the standard definition of the latter [8] .) Limited PEKS schemes. Boneh et. al. [7] also present a couple of PEKS schemes that avoid the RO model but are what they call limited. Both use a standard public-key encryption scheme as a building block. In the first scheme, the public key has size polynomial in the number of keywords that can be used. In the second scheme, the key and ciphertext have size polynomial in the number of trapdoors that can be securely issued to the gateway. Although these schemes are not very interesting due to their limited nature, one could ask about their consistency. In Appendix A we extend our definitions of consistency to this limited setting. Interestingly, we show that based on only a computational assumption about the underlying standard public-key encryption scheme (namely, that it is IND-CPA, or even just one-way), the first scheme is statistically consistent. We also show that the second scheme is computationally consistent under the same assumption on the standard public-key encryption scheme, and present a variant that is statistically consistent.
Consistency of other searchable encryption schemes. Of the other papers on searchable encryption of which we are aware [20, 13, 15, 22] , none formally define or rigorously address the notion of consistency for their respective types of searchable encryption schemes. Goh [13] and Golle, Staddon, and Waters [15] define consistency conditions analogous to BDOP's "perfect consistency" condition, but none of the constructions in [13, 15] satisfy their respective perfect consistency condition. Song, Wagner, and Perrig [20] and Waters et al. [22] do not formally state and prove consistency conditions for their respective searchable encryption schemes, but they, as well as Goh [13] , do acknowledge and informally bound the non-zero probability of a false positive.
Some definitions
Notation and conventions. If x is a string then |x| denotes its length, and if S is a set then |S| denotes its size. The empty string is denoted ε. Constructs in the RO (random oracle) model [4] might use multiple random oracles, but since one can always obtain these from a single one [4] , formal definitions will assume just one RO. Unless otherwise indicated, an algorithm may be randomized. "PT" stands for polynomial time and "PTA" for polynomial-time algorithm or adversary. We denote by N the set of positive integers, and by k ∈ N the security parameter. A message space MsgSp is a map, assigning to every k ∈ N a set of strings, such that {0, 1} k ⊆ MsgSp(k) ⊆ {0, 1} * for all k ∈ N and the following conditions hold: first, there is a PTA that on input 1 k , M returns 1 if M ∈ MsgSp(k) and 0 otherwise; second, {0, 1} |M | ⊆ MsgSp(k) for all k ∈ N and M ∈ MsgSp(k).
PEKS.
A public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme [7] PEKS = (KG, PEKS, Td, Test) consists of PTAs. Via (pk , sk ) $ ← KG(1 k ), where k ∈ N is the security parameter, the randomized keygeneration algorithm produces keys for the receiver; via C $ ← PEKS H (pk , w ) a sender encrypts a keyword w to get a ciphertext; via t w $ ← Td H (sk , w ) the receiver computes a trapdoor t w for keyword w and provides it to the gateway; via b ← Test H (t w , C ) the gateway tests whether C encrypts w , where b is a bit with 1 meaning "accept" or "yes" and 0 meaning "reject" or "no". Here H is a random oracle whose domain and/or range might depend on k and pk .
Consistency. The requirement of [7] can be divided into two parts. The first, which we call right keyword consistency, is that Test(t w , C ) always accepts when C encrypts w . More formally, for all k ∈ N and all w ∈ {0, 1} * ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk , sk ) $ ← KG(1 k ), the random choice of H, and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. Since we will always require this too, it is convenient henceforth to take it as an integral part of the PEKS notion and not mention it again, reserving the term "consistency" to only refer to what happens when the ciphertext encrypts a keyword different from the one for which the gateway is testing. In this regard, the requirement of [7] , which we will call perfect consistency, is that Test(t w , C ) always reject when C doesn't encrypt w . More formally, for all k ∈ N and all distinct w , w ∈ {0, 1} * ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk , sk ) $ ← KG(1 k ), the random choice of H, and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. (We note that [7] provide informal rather than formal statements, but it is hard to interpret them in any way other than what we have done.)
Privacy. Privacy for a PEKS scheme [7] asks that an adversary should not be able to distinguish between the encryption of two challenge keywords of its choice, even if it is allowed to obtain trapdoors for any non-challenge keywords. Formally, we associate to an adversary A and a bit b ∈ {0, 1} the following experiment:
The PEKS-IND-CPA-advantage of A is defined as
A scheme PEKS is said to be PEKS-IND-CPA-secure if the above advantage is a negligible function in k for all PTAs A.
Parameter generation algorithms and the BDH problem. All pairing based schemes will be parameterized by a pairing parameter generator. This is a PTA G that on input 1 k returns the description of an additive cyclic group G 1 of prime order p, where 2 k < p < 2 k+1 , the description of a multiplicative cyclic group G 2 of the same order, and a non-degenerate bilinear pairing e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . See [8] for a description of the properties of such pairings. We use G * 1 to denote G 1 \ {0}, i.e. the set of all group elements except the neutral element. We define the advantage of an adversary A in solving the BDH problem relative to a pairing parameter generator G as
We say that the BDH problem is hard relative to this generator if Adv bdh G,A is a negligible function in k for all PTAs A.
Consistency in PEKS
We show that the BDOP -PEKS scheme is not perfecty consistent, introduce new notions of statistical and computational consistency, and show that although BDOP -PEKS continues to fail the former it does meet the latter. We then provide a new PEKS scheme that is statistically consistent. Figure 1 presents the BDOP -PEKS scheme. It is based on a pairing parameter generator G. Proof: Since the number of possible keywords is infinite, there will certainly exist distinct keywords w , w ∈ {0, 1} * such that H 1 (w ) = H 1 (w ). The trapdoors for such keywords will be the same, and so
Perfect consistency of BDOP -PEKS
It is tempting to say that, since H 1 is a random oracle, the probability of a collision is small, and thus the above really does not matter. Whether or not this is true depends on how one wants to define consistency, which is the issue we explore next.
New notions of consistency
We consider various possible relaxations of perfect consistency and argue that the obvious ones are inadequate either because BDOP -PEKS continues to fail them or because they are too weak. We then motivate and present our approach and definitions.
A natural relaxation of perfect consistency. A natural way to obtain a relaxed definition of perfect consistency is by analogy with the definition of encryption with negligible decryption error [14, Section 5.1.2] . This results in asking that there exist a negligible function ν(·) such that for all k, all pairs (pk , sk ) that have positive probability of being output by KG(1 k ), all choices for the random oracle H, and all distinct keywords w , w ,
Here the probability is only over the coins for PEKS, Td, Test. This definition is, in our view, a perfectly adequate relaxation, and might be useful in some settings. The difficulty here is that it is still too strong in the sense that the BDOP -PEKS scheme continues to not meet it (our attack of Proposition 3.1 shows this too) and we are seeking something such a scheme could meet.
Another possible relaxation. The next obvious thought is to take the probability over the choices of keys and random oracle as well. This leads to asking that there is a negligible function ν(·) such that
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk , sk ) $ ← KG(1 k ), the random choice of H, and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. Now, since we are fixing w , w before taking the probability, and the latter includes the choice of H 1 in the BDOP -PEKS scheme, the probability that H 1 (w ) = H 1 (w ) is at most 2 −k . Our "attack" of Proposition 3.1 no longer applies. And in fact (using the techniques of our proof of Theorem 3.3) one can show that the BDOP scheme does meet the above condition. However, Equation (1) is (in our view) an incorrect definition of consistency because it does not allow w , w to depend on public quantities related to the receiver, such as its public key, the hash functions being used, or queries to them if they are random oracles. Our claim is that, as a result, the condition is too weak to guarantee that email is correctly routed by the gateway. Let us now try to justify this view.
Considering adversaries. It is helpful to move to a different perspective. Namely, imagine there is an adversary that wants to make consistency fail. What resources are available to it? It could certainly play the role of sender, and choose w any way it wants. In particular, it could, in real life, choose w as a function of the public key of the receiver, the hash functions being used, or queries to them if they are random oracles. It could also, potentially, influence the receiver into choosing w in some way helpful to the adversary, in particular as a function of all the same public quantities. But the fact that a PEKS scheme meets the condition of Equation (1) does not rule out the possibility that such an adversary exists and succeeds, for Equation (1) does not allow w , w to depend on public quantities related to the receiver. Does this matter? A consistency condition is not supposed to be about what an adversary might do, but rather what might happen in real life. However, it is actually rather hard to draw a line between the two. An adversary in this case is after all a model of worst-case real-life behavior. There would appear to be real situations where keywords do depend on public quantities. This might happen because the subject or topic of the email is related to the usage of the scheme and some event about it. So we should not rule this out.
One could try to find some meaningful dividing line between malicious behavior and worst-case real life behavior. Here is one. Namely, I might claim that when I encrypt data, I don't actually see your public key: only my encryption software sees it. Similarly, I don't directly query the random oracles; my software does. So how can the keywords I encrypt depend on these quantities unless I actually try to be malicious? But this type of argument is fragile. Today, many of us receive each other's public keys in email (PGP). I may want to send you email containing a discussion or question about the content of the public key you just sent me. Similar (though less obvious) arguments can be made about the hash functions and random oracles. In the end we are led to the conclusion that it is hard to draw a line between malicious behavior and worst-case real-life behavior, and thus it would be safer to just consider an adversary for a consistency condition as well.
Our definitions. Let PEKS = (KG, PEKS, Td, Test) be a PEKS scheme. We associate to an adversary U the following experiment:
We define the advantage of U as
The scheme is said to be perfectly consistent if this advantage is 0 for all (computationally unrestricted) adversaries U, statistically consistent if it is negligible for all (computationally unrestricted) adversaries U, and computationally consistent if it is negligible for all PTAs U. We remark that we have purposely re-used the term perfect consistency, for in fact the above notion of perfect consistency coincides with the one from [7] recalled above.
Stronger notions?
In giving the adversary U the public key and access to the random oracle, our definition is already quite liberal. One could however, consider an even more liberal (i.e. stronger) definition in which the adversary gets a trapdoor oracle and/or a test oracle under trapdoors for keywords of its choice. Consideration of whether this would be appropriate returns us again to the issues discussed above. We must ask whether in "real-life" there could be an occasion in which the keywords chosen by a sender could depend on information provided by these oracles. The answer is not cut-and-dry. Although quite far-fetched, one might actually imagine such situations. We view the situation as being analogous to the one for security conditions where we often have several different definitions of different strengths to capture increasingly greater adversary resources. For example, for encryption we have the basic IND-CPA and then its extension to IND-CCA. Our sense is that the definition we give above is kind of the "IND-CPA" of consistency conditions, and that the stronger one we have alluded to would be an "IND-CCA" version. For the moment we are content to stick to the "IND-CPA" version, for, even if weaker than the other one, it is already very strong, and also because even in the security realm we are (following [7] ) not considering IND-CCA in this paper.
Statistical and computational consistency of BDOP -PEKS
Having formally defined the statistical and computational consistency requirements for PEKS schemes, we return to evaluating the consistency of BDOP -PEKS . We first observe that Proposition 3.1 extends to show:
The BDOP -PEKS scheme is not statistically consistent.
Proof: Recall that in the proof of Proposition 3.1 we show that there there exist two distinct keywords w , w ∈ {0, 1} * such that H 1 (w ) = H 1 (w ), and that, for these two keywords, Test(Td(sk , w ), PEKS(pk , w )) will always return 1. A computationally unbounded adversary can find two such keywords by exhaustive search.
On the positive side, the following means that BDOP -PEKS is probably fine in practice:
The BDOP -PEKS scheme is computationally consistent.
Proof: Let U be a PTA. Let (w , w ) denote the pair of keywords that U returns in the consistency experiment, and assume without loss of generality that w = w . Let r ∈ Z * p denote the value chosen at random by PEKS H 1 ,H 2 (pk , w ). Let T = e(H 1 (w ), sP ) r and let T = e(H 1 (w ), sP ) r . Note that U wins exactly when w = w and H 2 (T ) = H 2 (T ). Let w 1 , . . . , w q 1 be the queries of U to H 1 and let WSet = {w 1 , . . . , w q 1 (k) } ∪ {w , w }. Let T 1 , . . . , T q 2 (k) be the queries of U to H 2 and let TSet = {T 1 , . . . , T q 2 (k) } ∪ {T, T }. Let E 1 be the event that there exist distinct v, v ∈ WSet such that H 1 (v) = H 1 (v ), and let E 2 be the event that there exist distinct x, x ∈ TSet such that H 2 (x) = H 2 (x ). If Pr [ · ] denotes the probability in the consistency experiment, then
Our definition of G required that |G 1 | > 2 k , and hence the first and second terms are respectively upper bounded via (q 1 +2) 2 /|G 1 | < (q 1 +2) 2 /2 k and (q 2 +2) 2 /2 k . Now se claim that if H 1 (w ) = H 1 (w ), then X = X . Under this claim, the last term of Equation (2) is 0, since if E 1 occurs, then H 1 (w ) = H 1 (w ) and T = T , and if E 2 also occurs, then H 2 (T ) = H 2 (T ). To justify our claim above, note that if H 1 (w ) = H 1 (w ), then H 1 (w ) = αP and H 1 (w ) = α P for some distinct α, α ∈ Z p . Setting g = e(P, P ) rs , we can rewrite T, T as T = g α and T = g α . Since e(P, P ) is a generator of G 2 , since G 2 is of prime order p, and since p does not divide rs, g must also be a generator of G 2 . Thus T = T .
if C = w then return 1 else return 0 if C cannot be parsed as (rP, c, t, K 2 ) then return 0 T ← e(rP, sH 1 (w )) 
A statistically consistent PEKS scheme
We present the first PEKS scheme that is (PEKS-IND-CPA and) statistically consistent. To define the scheme, we first introduce the function f (k) = k lg(k) . (Any function that is super-polynomial but sub-exponential would suffice. This choice is made for concreteness.) The algorithms constituting our scheme PEKS-STAT are then depicted in Figure 2 .
The scheme uses ideas from the BDOP -PEKS scheme [7] as well as from the BF -IBE scheme [8] , but adds some new elements. Note that the encryption algorithm is trivial, returning the keyword as the ciphertext, when the keyword has length more than f (k). If not, the processing is more complex, depending on some random choices and numerous random oracles. In particular the random choice of "session" key K, and the fact that the random oracle H 2 is length-increasing, are important. The first thing we stress about the scheme is that the algorithms are PT. This is because PT means in the length of the inputs, and the input of (say) the encryption algorithm includes w as well as 1 k , so it can test whether |w | ≥ f (k) in polynomial time. Now the following says that the scheme is private:
The PEKS-STAT scheme is PEKS-IND-CPA-secure assuming that the BDH problem is hard relative to generator G.
Before providing the proof, let us give some intuition. While sending w in the clear looks at first glance like it violates privacy, the reason it does not is that this only happens when w has length at least f (k), and the privacy adversary is poly(k) time and thus cannot even write down such a keyword in order to query it to its challenge oracle. (This is where we use the fact that f (k) is super-polynomial. We will use the fact that it is sub-exponential in the proof of statistical consistency.) The privacy adversary is thus effectively restricted to attacking the scheme only on keywords of size at most f (k). Here, privacy can be reduced to solving the BDH problem using techniques used to prove IBE-IND-CPA of the BF -IBE scheme [8] and to prove anonymity of the same scheme (cf. Theorem 4.4).
Proof of Proposition 3.4: Let B be a PTA attacking the PEKS-IND-CPA security PEKS-STAT = (KG, PEKS, Td, Test). Say it makes at mostueries to its Trapd(·, ·) oracle and at most q i queries to H i for i = 1, 2, 3. (These are actually functions of k, but we drop the argument to simplify notation.)
Trapd(·),H1,H2,H3,H4 (guess, C , state) We construct a PTA A attacking the BDH relative to G such that
Our adversary A is shown in Figure 3 . We show that A outputs the correct answer T = e(P, P ) rsα with probability at least the quantity on the right-hand-side of Equation (3).
Let t(k) be a polynomial which bounds the running time of B. So there is an integer N such that t(k) < f (k) for all k ≥ N . Notice that the PEKS algorithm of the PEKS scheme in Figure 2 returns w in the clear when |w | ≥ f (k). However, the keywords output by B in the find stage have length at most t(k), so if k ≥ N , the encryption is done by the code for the case |w | < f (k) shown in PEKS.
Since it suffices to prove Equation (3) for all k ≥ N , we assume that the encryption is done by the code for the case |w | < f (k) shown in PEKS.
Let Pr 1 [ · ] denote the probability over the experiment for Adv bdh G,A (k) as defined in Section 2. Let E 1 denote the event in this experiment that A aborts in simulating the trapdoor oracle. Let E 2 denote the event that d[w b ] = 0 (which also causes A to abort). Let E 3 denote the event that Q = ∅ (which also causes A to abort). Let E 4 denote the event that B issues a query H 2 (e(rP, sH 1 (w b ))) or H 4 (e(rP, sH 1 (w b ))). Let Pr 2 [ · ] denote the probability over Exp
for a random choice for b ∈ {0, 1}, and let b denote the output of B in this experiment. Let E 5 be the event that B issues a query H 2 (e(rP, sH 1 (w b ))) or H 4 (e(rP, sH 1 (w b ))) to its oracles in this experiment. Let E 6 denote the event that B issues a query K w b to its oracle H 3 , where K is the random k-bit string that
used in PEKS when replying B's challenge after the find stage. Equation (3) follows from the following claims.
In the above simulation if none of the events E 1 , E 2 and E 3 happens, then A will randomly choose an element T $ ← Q and return T x[w b ] −1 . However, by definition of event E 1 , one of the elements in Q is equal to e(P, P ) srα·x[w b ] , thus A has at least the probability of 1/|Q| ≥ 1/(q 2 + q 4 ) to give the correct answer to the BDH problem. 2
Notice that when event E 4 happens, the set Q must contain at least one element, thus E 3 is always false. Therefore we have Pr
The claim follows by conditioning off of the event
Under the condition that A does not abort, the simulation is perfect, i.e. all A's answers to the simulated oracles Trapd(sk , ·), H 1 (·) . . . H 4 (·) have exactly the same distribution as those in the real PEKS-IND-CPA experiment. 2
First observe that
Equation (4) comes from the fact that, by assumption, B makes at most q 3 queries to H 3 . Equation (5) comes from the fact that, if E 5 and E 6 both do not occur, B learns no information from the ciphertext. Rearranging gives
The last equality follows from the standard result that Adv
Since for every keyword w the biased coin d[w ] is flipped independently, and Pr[d[w ] = 1] = δ for all w , let Q T be the set of queries issued by B to the Trapd(sk , ·) oracle, then
The last quantity is maximized at δ = 1/(q + 1) with value at least 1/e(q + 1).
Let us move to the more interesting claim, namely consistency:
The PEKS-STAT scheme is statistically consistent.
Before providing the proof, let us give some intuition. The main issue is that the computationally unbounded consistency adversary U can easily find any collisions that exist for the random-oracle hash functions. Let w , w denote the keywords output by the adversary U. We proceed via a case analysis. One can show that if either w or w have length at least f (k) then Test will not be wrong. The interesting case is when w , w both have length at most f (k). Let (rP, c, t, K 2 ) denote the challenge ciphertext formed by encrypting w . Let T = e(rP, H 1 (w )) and let K = c⊕H 4 (T ) be the underlying session key. Let T = e(rP, H 1 (w )) and let K = c⊕H 4 (T ). Now consider two cases. The first case is that H 1 (w ) = H 1 (w ). Properties of pairings imply T = T . Now we claim that this means K 2 = H 2 (T ) = H 2 (T ) with high probability, and thus Test will correctly reject, meaning U does not win. This is not merely because H 2 is random, for remember the adversary is not computationally bounded and can search for, and find, any collisions that exist. The reason is that H 2 is with high probability an injective function and collisions for it simply do not exist. The reason for this is that its domain is G 2 which has size p < 2 k+1 (our definition of a pairing parameter generator required this) but H 2 outputs 3k bits, and thus a union bound can be used to show that H 2 is injective except with probability 4 · 2 −k .
The second case, which is the harder one, is that H 1 (w ) = H 1 (w ) (again, we cannot prevent U from finding collisions in H 1 ), and this is where we will use the fact that f (k) is sub-exponential. Here the idea is that at the time it chooses w , w , adversary U does not know the value of the session key K that is randomly chosen later. We divide pairs (V, V ) of strings of length at most f (k) (candidate keywords) into two classes. A pair is heavy if there are "lots" of session keys L such that
, and light otherwise, where "lots" is defined as 2 k/2 . Now we again consider two cases. If (w , w ) is light then the randomly chosen K has only a 2 −k/2 chance of being a session key for which H 3 (K w ) = H 3 (K w ) and thus Test will most likely reject, so U does not win. Next we use an occupancy problem based counting argument to show that the probability (over H 3 ) that a particular pair (V, V ) of keywords is heavy is double exponentially small in k. But the number of choices of keyword pairs is 2 O(f (k)) which is sub-double-exponentially small by choice of f (k), and thus a union bound allows us to conclude that (w , w ) is not likely to be heavy.
Proof of Proposition 3.5: Let U be a computationally unbounded adversary algorithm. We show that there is a constant c > 0 such that
Consider the experiment Exp peks-consist

PEKS,U
(k). Let w , w denote the keywords output by U and assume they are distinct, since otherwise U does not win. Let Win be the event that the experiment outputs 1. Let r, K be the random choices made by PEKS H 1 ,H 2 ,H 3 ,H 4 (pk , w ) in the experiment. Then we let
The random choices of H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , r and K determine all these random variables. Let Bad be the event that Test(t w , (C, c, t, K 2 )) = 1. Let Big be the event that either w or w has length greater than or equal to f (k). Then
Suppose Big holds. If |w | ≥ f (k) then Test(t w , C) will return 1 only if C = w . But this will not be the case because either |w | ≥ f (k) and C = w = w , or |w | < f (k) and, for large enough k, |C| < f (k) ≤ |w |. On the other hand if |w | ≥ f (k) and |w | < f (k) then C = w and the latter cannot be parsed as an appropriate 4-tuple (rP, c, t, K 2 ), so Test will return 0. We conclude that Pr [ Bad | Big ] = 0 for all large enough k. We now want to bound
We bound p 1 , p 2 in turn. We let S be the set of all distinct pairs (g, g ) of elements in G 1 . So p 1 is at most the sum, over all (g, g ) ∈ S, of the product terms
Properties of pairings tell us that g = g implies e(rP, g) = e(rP, g ). So due to the randomness of H 2 , the first term of each product above is 2 −3k . However, there are at most p 2 choices for the pair (g, g ), and we know that p < 2 k+1 . Thus we have
(As we discussed above, the intuition here is that with probability at least 1 − 4 · 2 −k the function H 2 is injective.) We now proceed to bound p 2 . In this argument, we regard H 1 as fixed. (Formally, imagine that we condition on a particular choice of H 1 . This suffices since what follows holds for all values of this choice.) Let U be the set of all pairs (V, V ) of distinct keywords of length at most
We say that (V, V ) is heavy if |Keys(V, V )| ≥ 2 k/2 , and light otherwise. We let Lt(V, V ) denote the event that (V, V ) is light and Hw(V, V ) the event that (V, V ) is heavy, where the probability is over the choice of
We bound these in turn. We have
Equation (6) is justified by the definition of the Test, the fact that K is chosen at random from {0, 1} k and the fact that (V, V ) is light. Now we turn to bounding p H .
where the probability is only over the choice of H 3 .
Note the bound of the claim is double-exponentially small. We prove the claim later. Using it we can conclude via the union bound:
Proof of Claim. We use an occupancy problem approach:
For sufficiently large k (specifically, k ≥ 6) we have x ≤ 1/2. So the above is at most
as desired.
PEKS and anonymous IBE
We formally define anonymity of IBE schemes and investigate the relation between PEKS and anonymous IBE. ← Enc H (pk , id , M ) a sender encrypts a message M to identity id to get a ciphertext; via M ← Dec H (usk , C ) the possessor of secret key usk decrypts ciphertext C to get back a message. Here H is a random oracle with domain and range possibly depending on k and pk . Associated to the scheme is a message space MsgSp obeying the conventions discussed in Section 2. For consistency, we require that for all k ∈ N, all identities id and messages M ∈ MsgSp(k)
Definitions
, where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk , msk ) $ ← Setup(1 k ), the random choice of H, and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
Privacy and anonymity. Privacy (IBE-IND-CPA) follows [8] while anonymity (IBE-ANO-CPA) is a straightforward adaptation of [2] to IBE schemes. Let IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be an IBE scheme with associated message space MsgSp. To an adversary A and bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we associate the following experiments:
where the oracle KeyDer(id ) is defined as
For prop ∈ {ind, ano}, we define the advantage of A in the corresponding experiment as
IBE scheme IBE is said to be IBE-IND-CPA-secure (resp., IBE-ANO-CPA-secure) if the respective advantage function is negligible for all PTAs A.
The bdop-ibe-2-peks transform
The bdop-ibe-2-peks transform [7] takes input an IBE scheme IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) and returns a PEKS scheme PEKS = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) as follows. The public key pk and secret key sk of the receiver in the PEKS scheme are the master public and secret keys, respectively, of the IBE scheme (i.e., KG = Setup). The trapdoor associated to keyword w is the secret key that the IBE scheme would assign to the identity w (i.e., Td(sk , w ) = KeyDer(sk , w )). A keyword w is PEKSencrypted by IBE-encrypting the message 0 k for the identity w (i.e., PEKS(pk , w ) = Enc(pk , w , 0 k )). Finally, testing is done by checking that the ciphertext decrypts to 0 k (i.e., Test(t w , C ) returns 1 iff Dec(t w , C ) = 0 k ).
We know that BF -IBE is anonymous (Theorem 4.4), that BDOP -PEKS = bdop-ibe-2-peks( BF -IBE ), and that BDOP -PEKS is not statistically consistent (Proposition 3.2). We can conclude that the bdop-ibe-2-peks transformation does not necessarily yield a statistically consistent PEKS scheme. The following strengthens this, showing that (under the minimal assumption of the existence of some IBE-IND-CPA-and IBE-ANO-CPA-secure IBE scheme) the transform does not necessarily even yield a computationally consistent PEKS scheme. This means that the transform is not in general a suitable way to obtain a PEKS scheme. Then there exists a IBE-ANO-CPA-secure and IBE-IND-CPA-secure IBE scheme IBE such that the PEKS scheme PEKS derived from IBE via bdop-ibe-2-peks is not computationally consistent.
Proof: Let IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be any IBE-ANO-CPA-and IBE-IND-CPA-secure IBE scheme. We construct the IBE scheme IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) to have the master-key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms shown in Figure 4 . (We assume that the message space MsgSp(k) of IBE includes {0, 1} 2k . This is wlog since by definition it includes {0, 1} k and hence hybrid encryption could be used to encrypt messages of length more than k bits.) The IBE-IND-CPA- and IBE-ANO-CPA-security of IBE follows from simple reductions from the security of IBE, and we omit the details here. To show that PEKS is not computationally consistent, we let w , w be any two distinct keywords. We then let B be the PT adversary against the computational consistency of PEKS that (given the public key) simply returns these two keywords. We claim that B succeeds with probability almost one. More precisely, we claim that there is a negligible function ν such that Adv
Note the attack is strong in the sense that it essentially says that consistency fails with respect to all pairs of distinct keywords.
To prove this claim, we construct a PT adversary A against the IBE-IND-CPA-security of IBE such
Since we assume that IBE satisfies IBE-IND-CPA-security, the function Adv
(k) is negligible, and hence the claim follows.
In its find stage, given input master public key pk , adversary A returns as challenge identity w and as challenge messages 0 k R 0 and 0 k R 1 where R 0 , R 1 $ ← {0, 1} k . In the guess stage, given challenge ciphertext C (that encrypts 0 k R b under identity w for challenge bit b ∈ {0, 1}), it runs the decryption algorithm Dec with secret key usk [w ], having obtained the latter via its key-derivation oracle, and returns 0 if the last k bits of the resulting keyword are R 0 and 1 otherwise. For the analysis, let E 0 denote the event that the string comprising the last k bits of Dec(usk [w ], Enc(pk , w , 0 k R 0 ))) is equal to R 0 , and E 1 the event that the string comprising the last k bits of Dec(pk , usk [w ], Enc(pk , w , 0 k R 1 ))) is equal to R 0 . Then
where the probability is over random choices of (pk , msk ) $ ← Setup(1 k ) and random choices of strings R 0 , R 1 . Equation (7) holds because R 0 , R 1 are independent, random k-bit strings. Now, the probability that B wins in the computational consistency experiment for PEKS = bdop-ibe-2-peks(IBE ) is at least the probability that the last k bits of Dec(usk [w ], Enc(pk , w , 0 k R 0 )) equal R 0 , since in this case Enc((pk , R 0 ), w , 0 k ) returns 0 k . That is, its advantage is at least Pr[¬E 0 ]. So 
PEKS,B
(k)
as claimed.
The new-ibe-2-peks transformation
The negative result in Theorem 4.1 raises the question: Does the existence of IBE schemes imply the existence of computationally consistent PEKS schemes? We answer that in the affirmative by presenting a revision to the BDOP transformation, called new-ibe-2-peks, that transforms any IBE-IND-CPAand IBE-ANO-CPA-secure IBE scheme into a PEKS-IND-CPA-secure and computationally consistent PEKS scheme. It is similar to bdop-ibe-2-peks except that instead of always using 0 k as the message encrypted, the PEKS-encryption algorithm chooses and encrypts a random message R and appends R in the clear to the ciphertext. In more detail, the new-ibe-2-peks transform takes input an IBE scheme IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) and returns a PEKS scheme PEKS = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) as follows.
The public key pk and secret key sk of the receiver in the PEKS scheme are the master public and secret keys, respectively, of the IBE scheme. (I.e. KG = Setup.) The trapdoor associated to keyword w is the secret key that the IBE scheme would assign to the identity w . (I.e. Td(sk , w ) = KeyDer(sk , w ).) PEKS-encryption of keyword w is done as follows:
Intuitively, this construction avoids the problem of oddly-behaving Dec algorithms by making sure that the only way to ruin the consistency of the PEKS scheme is by correctly guessing the value encrypted by a ciphertext, using the secret key of a different identity, which should not be possible for an IBE-IND-CPA-secure IBE scheme. Hence, the consistency of the resulting PEKS scheme is due to the data privacy property of the IBE scheme, while the data privacy property of the PEKS scheme comes from the anonymity of the IBE scheme. The formal result statement and proof follow. Proof: Let U be any PTA attacking the computational consistency of PEKS, and consider the following PTA A attacking the IBE-IND-CPA-security of IBE. In its find stage, given master public key pk , adversary A runs U(pk ) to get keywords w , w . It returns w as the challenge identity and R 0 , R 1 $ ← {0, 1} k as the challenge messages. In the guess stage, given challenge ciphertext C (that encrypts R b under identity w for challenge bit b ∈ {0, 1}), A uses its key-derivation oracle to obtain a trapdoor t w for w . If Dec(t w , C ) = R 1 then it returns 1 else it returns 0. It is easy to see that
Thus Adv 
A sufficient condition for anonymity
Halevi [16] provides a simple sufficient condition for an IND-CPA public-key encryption scheme to meet the notion of anonymity (a.k.a. key-privacy) of [2] . The condition is that even a computationally unbounded adversary, given public keys pk 0 , pk 1 and the encryption of a random message under pk b , have only a negligible advantage in determining the random challenge bit b. Towards finding anonymous IBE schemes (a task motivated by Theorem 4.2) we extend Halevi's condition to identitybased encryption. In the process we also extend it in two other ways: first to handle the random oracle model (the standard model is a special case) and second to weaken the statistical (i.e. informationtheoretic) requirement of [16] to a computational one. (The application of this paper does not need the last extension, but it may be useful in other contexts.)
We begin by defining a relevant (new) notion of security that we call IBE-ANO-RE-CPA. Let IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be an IBE scheme with associated message space MsgSp. We associate to an adversary A and bit b ∈ {0, 1} the following experiment:
The IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-advantage of an adversary A in violating the anonymity of the scheme IBE is defined as Summing concludes the proof. We omit the details, save to remark that we use here the second convention about message spaces noted in Section 2. Figure 5 : Algorithms of the IBE scheme BF -IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec). Here G is a pairing parameter generator and H 1 : {0, 1} * → G * 1 and H 2 : G 2 → {0, 1} k are random oracles. The message space is defined by MsgSp(k) = {0, 1} k for all k ∈ N.
Anonymity of BF -IBE
The Boneh-Franklin BasicIdent IBE scheme [8] is shown in Figure 5 . We apply Lemma 4.3 to give a simple proof that it is IBE-ANO-CPA.
Theorem 4.4
The BF -IBE scheme is IBE-ANO-CPA-secure assuming that the BDH is hard relative to generator G.
Proof: Given Lemma 4.3, and given that the BF -IBE scheme is IBE-IND-CPA-secure [8] , it suffices to show that the scheme is IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-secure. Notice that the ciphertext C in Figure 5 has two parts, namely U = rP and V = M ⊕ H 2 (T ). The value U is chosen uniformly at random from G * 1 by the encryption algorithm. If the message M is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} k , then V is also uniformly distributed in {0, 1} k and independent of the H 2 (T ). Thus in both the 0-and 1-worlds of the IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-security game, the challenge ciphertext C has exactly the same distribution. Therefore any adversary against IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-security will have 0 advantage.
Anonymous HIBE
Definitions
HIBE schemes. A hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme [17, 12, 6 ] is a generalization of an IBE scheme in which an identity is a vector of strings id = (id 1 , . . . , id l ) with the understanding that when l = 0 this is the empty vector (). The number of components in this vector is called the level of the identity and is denoted |id |. If 0 ≤ i ≤ l then id | i = (id 1 , . . . , id i ) denotes the vector containing the first i components of id . If |id | ≥ l + 1 (l ≥ 0) and id | l = id then we say that id is an ancestor of id , or equivalently, that id is a descendant of id . If the level of id is l + 1 then id is a parent of id , or, equivalently, id is a child of id . For any id with |id | ≥ 1 we let par(id ) = id | |id|−1 denote its parent. Two nodes id = (id 1 , . . . , id l ) and id = (id 1 , . . . , id l ) at level l are said to be siblings iff id | l−1 = id | l−1 . Moreover, if id l < id l in lexicographic order, then id is a left sibling of id and id is a right sibling of id . An identity at level one or more can be issued a secret key by its parent. (And thus an identity can issue keys for any of its descendants if necessary.) Formally a HIBE scheme HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) consists of four PTAs. Via (pk , msk =
usk [()])
$ ← Setup(1 k ), where k ∈ N is a security parameter, the randomized key-generation algorithm produces master keys, with the secret key being associated to the (unique) identity () at level 0; via
, id ) the parent of an identity id with |id | ≥ 1 can compute a secret key for id ; via C $ ← Enc H (pk , id , M ) a sender encrypts a message M to identity id to get a ciphertext; via M ← Dec H (usk [id ], C ) the identity id decrypts ciphertext C to get back a message. Here H is a random oracle with domain and range possibly depending on k and pk . Associated to the scheme is a message space MsgSp obeying the conventions discussed in Section 2. For consistency, we require that for all k ∈ N, all identities id with |id | ≥ 1 and all messages M ∈ MsgSp(k),
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk , usk [()]) $ ← Setup(1 k ), the random choice of H, and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
Privacy and anonymity. The notion of privacy for HIBE schemes is analogous to that for IBE schemes (IBE-IND-CPA) but using identity vectors rather than identity strings and where the adversary is not allowed to query the KeyDer oracle for the secret key of any ancestor of the identity under attack. Since we will deal with schemes where privacy holds only up to some level, the notion is parameterized by a maximum depth function d: N → N, and all identities id (in queries or challenges) must have |id | ≤ d(k). To allow a fine-grained treatment of anonymity we introduce the concept of anonymity at a set L(k) of levels, meaning that in an experiment the adversary A is challenged to distinguish two distinct identities differing only at levels l ∈ L(k). (Here for each k, L(k) is a finite set of integers. For ease of notation, we will write l rather than {l} when L(k) = {l} is a singleton set.)
Formally, let HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be an identity-based encryption scheme with message space MsgSp, let d : N → N be the maximum depth, and let L be a set of levels. Let diff(·, ·) be the function that returns the set of coordinates at which the input identities differ, and anc(·) the function returning the set of ancestors of the input identity. To any bit b ∈ {0, 1} and any adversary A, we associate the experiments:
where the oracle KeyDer(·) is defined as
We define the advantage of A in the corresponding experiments as 
A sufficient condition for anonymity
We further extend Lemma 4.3 to the hierarchical case. To this end, we introduce a new notion
] as follows. Let HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be a HIBE scheme with message space MsgSp, let L be a set of levels, and let d be the maximum hierarchy depth. To an adversary A and a bit b, we associate the following experiment:
The 
HIBE-ANO-RE-CPA[L, d]-advantage of an adversary A in violating the level-L anonymity of the scheme HIBE with depth d(k) is defined as
Adv hibe-ano-re[L,d] HIBE,A (k) = Pr Exp hibe-ano-re-1[L,d] IBE,A (k) = 1 − Pr Exp hibe-ano-re-0[L,d] IBE,A (k) = 1 .
Construction
The HIBE scheme of [17] appears to be anonymous, but supports only two levels of identities, and is only resistant against limited collusions at the second level, and hence is not usable for our constructions that follow. Since the HIBE of [12] , here denoted GS-HIBE, is equivalent to the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [8] when restricted to the first level, and since the latter is provably anonymous as per Theorem 4.4, one could hope that GS-HIBE is level-1 anonymous, but this turns out not to be true, and the HIBE of [6] is not level-1 anonymous either. To see why, consider the following. The GS-HIBE encryption of a message M under identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id l ) is a tuple
where H 1 , H 2 are random oracles, P is a generator of a pairing group that is part of pk , and r is chosen at random from Z p by the encryption algorithm. Anonymity is violated because an adversary can decide whether a given ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) is intended for id = (id 1 , id 2 ) or id = (id 1 , id 2 ) by checking whether e(C 2 , P ) equals e(C 1 , H 1 (id )) or e(C 1 , H 1 (id )). Figure 6 : Algorithms of the mGS-HIBE scheme mGS-HIBE. G is a pairing parameter generator and
The lack of anonymity in GS-HIBE stems from the fact that the hashes in the first l components of the ciphertext depend on the first component of the recipient's identity. In Figure 6 , we present a modified scheme that uses a different random oracle H 1,l for each level l, and that computes ciphertexts as
The following implies in particular that mGS-HIBE is the first full HIBE scheme providing any anonymity at all. The restriction on d is inherited from [12] . We split up the proof in the following two lemmas. The proof of the first is given in Appendix C, and recycles ideas from [12, 8] . We use Lemma 5.1 to prove the second lemma. secure. In the challenge ciphertext (C * 1 , . . . , C * l+1 ), the first component C 1 is chosen uniformly at random from G * 1 . Component C * i for 2 ≤ i ≤ l is uniquely defined by C * 1 and the i-th component of the identity, which is the same for both challenge identities since they can only differ at level 1. Finally, if the message M is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} k , then the last component C * l+1 is also uniformly distributed over {0, 1} k , independent of H 2 (e(rH 1,1 (id 1 ), Q 0 )). Hence, the challenge ciphertext is identically distributed in both worlds, and the advantage of any adversary is 0.
Public-key encryption with temporary keyword search
In a PEKS scheme, once the gateway has the trapdoor for a certain period, it can test whether this keyword was present in past ciphertexts, and can test its presence in any future ciphertexts. It may be useful to limit the period in which the trapdoor can be used. Here we propose an extension of PEKS that allows this. We call it public-key encryption with temporary keyword search (PETKS) or temporarily searchable encryption for short. A trapdoor here is created for a time interval [s, e] and will only allow the gateway to test whether ciphertexts created in this time interval contain the keyword.
Definitions
PETKS schemes. Public-key encryption with temporary keyword search (PETKS) is a generalization of PEKS in which a trapdoor can be issued for any desired window of time rather than forever. H (t w , C ) the gateway tests whether C encrypts w , where b is a bit with 1 meaning "accept" or "yes" and 0 meaning "reject" or "no". Here H is a random oracle whose domain and/or range might depend on k and pk . We require that for all k ∈ N, all s, e, i with 0 ≤ s ≤ i ≤ e ≤ N (k) − 1, and all w ∈ {0, 1} * ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk , sk ) $ ← KG(1 k ), the random choice of H, and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
Consistency. As we did for standard PEKS in Section 3.2, we present a consistency definition for PETKS schemes below. Let PETKS = (KG, Td, PETKS, Test, N ) be a PETKS scheme. We associate to an adversary U the following experiment:
.e]) and Test H (t w , C) = 1 then return 1 else return 0
We define the advantage of U as Like in the PEKS case, we say the PETKS scheme is perfectly consistent if this advantage is 0 for all (computationally unrestricted) adversaries U, statistically consistent if it is negligible for all (computationally unrestricted) adversaries U, and computationally consistent if it is negligible for all PTAs U. Note that this definition also considers it a consistency problem if a trapdoor for interval [s.
.e] tests positively for a ciphertext created in a time period i ∈ [s..e]. This type of problems is easily protected against, however, by letting the Td and PETKS algorithms include information about the intended time periods into the trapdoors and ciphertexts, respectively.
Privacy. Privacy for a PETKS scheme asks that an adversary should not be able to distinguish between the encryption of two challenge keywords of its choice in a time period i ∈ [0..N (k) − 1] of its choice, even if it is allowed not only to obtain trapdoors for non-challenge keywords issued for any time interval, but also is allowed to obtain trapdoors for any keywords (even the challenge ones), issued for time intervals not containing i. More formally, let PETKS = (KG, Td, PETKS, Test, N ) be a PETKS scheme. To any bit b ∈ {0, 1} and any adversary A, we associate the following experiment:
The PETKS-IND-CPA-advantage of an adversary A in violating the chosen-plaintext indistinguishability of PETKS is defined as
A PETKS scheme PETKS is said to be PETKS-IND-CPA-secure if this advantage is a negligible function in k for all PTAs A.
Constructions for PETKS schemes
Constructions with linear complexity. PETKS is reminiscent of forward-security [3, 9] , and, as in these works, there are straightforward solutions with keys or trapdoors of length linear in N (k). One such solution is to use a standard PEKS scheme and generate a different key pair (pk i , sk i ) for each time period i ∈ [0..N (k ) − 1]. Let pk = (pk 0 , . . . , pk N (k)−1 ) be the PETKS public key and sk = (sk 0 , . . . , sk N (k )−1 ) be the PETKS secret key. During time period i, the sender encrypts a keyword w by encrypting w under pk i using the PEKS scheme. The trapdoor for a keyword w in the interval [s.
.e] consists of all PEKS trapdoors for w of periods s, . . . , e. A somewhat more efficient solution is to let the PETKS master key pair be a single key pair for the standard PEKS scheme, and append the time period to the keyword when encrypting or computing trapdoors. This scheme achieves short public and secret keys, but still has trapdoor length linear in N (k), because the PETKS trapdoor still contains PEKS trapdoors for all time periods s, . . . , e.
The hibe-2-petks transformation. We now present a transformation hibe-2-petks of a HIBE scheme into a PETKS scheme that yields a PETKS scheme with complexity logarithmic in N for all parameters. The construction is very similar to the generic construction of forward-secure encryption from binary-tree encryption [9] . The number of time periods is N (k) = 2 t(k) for some
, then let i 1 . . . i t(k) denote its binary representation as a t(k)-bit string. Intuitively, our construction instantiates a HIBE of depth t(k) + 1 with keywords as the first level of the identity tree and the time structure on the lower levels. The trapdoor for keyword w and interval of time periods [s.
.e] consists of the user secret keys of all identities from (w , s 1 , . . . , s t(k) ) to (w , e 1 , . . . , e t(k) ), but taking advantage of the hierarchical structure to include entire subtrees of keys.
More precisely, let HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be a HIBE scheme. Then we associate to it a PETKS scheme PETKS = hibe-2-petks(HIBE , t(k)) = (KG, Td, PETKS, Test, N ) such that , (w , i 1 , . . . , i t(k) ), C 1 ). The trapdoor algorithm Td(sk , w , s, e) first constructs a set T of identities as follows. Let j be the smallest index so that s j = e j . Then T is the set containing  (w , s 1 , . . . , s t(k) ), (w , e 1 , . . . , e t(k) ), the right siblings of all nodes on the path from (w , s 1 , . . . , s j+1 ) to  (w , s 1 , . . . , s t(k) ), and the left siblings of all nodes on the path from (w , e 1 , . . . , e j+1 ) to (w , e 1 , . . . , e t(k) ). If j does not exist, meaning s = e, then T ← { (w , s 1 , . . . , s t(k) )}. The trapdoor t w is the set of tuples ((w , i 1 , . . . , i r ), KeyDer(sk , (w , i 1 , . . . , i r ))) for all (i 1 , . . . , i r ) ∈ T . To test a ciphertext (i, C 1 , C 2 ), the Test algorithm looks up a tuple ((w , i 1 , . . . , i r ), usk [(w , i 1 , . . . , i r )]) in t w . It returns 0 when no such tuple is found. Otherwise, it derives usk [(w , i 1 , . . . , i t(k) )] using repetitive calls to the KeyDer algorithm, and returns 1 iff Dec (usk [(w , i 1 , . . . , i t(k) )], C 2 ) = C 1 .
Theorem 6.1 Let HIBE be a HIBE scheme, and let PETKS = hibe-2-petks(HIBE , t(k)) where
We split the proof of the theorem over the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6.2 Let HIBE be a HIBE scheme, and let PETKS = hibe-2-petks(HIBE , t(k)) where
Proof: Let HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be a level-1 anonymous (HIBE-ANO-CPA[1, t + 1]-secure) HIBE scheme, and let PETKS = hibe-2-petks(HIBE , t(k)) = (KG, Td, PETKS, Test, N ) be the associated PETKS scheme. Given an adversary A breaking the PETKS-IND-CPA security of PETKS, we construct an adversary B breaking the HIBE-ANO-CPA[1, t + 1] security of HIBE as follows. On input public parameters pk , B runs A on inputs (find, pk ). When A queries its Trapd oracle for the trapdoor of keyword w for interval [s..e], then B constructs a set T exactly as the Td algorithm does, and constructs the corresponding trapdoor by querying its KeyDer oracle for the user secret keys corresponding to all identities in T .
When A outputs challenge keywords w 0 , w 1 and time period i, B outputs challenge identities id 0 = (w 0 , i 1 , . . . , i t ), id 1 = (w 1 , i 1 , . . . , i t ) and a randomly chosen message M of length k. Note that identities id 0 and id 1 differ on level 1, but are otherwise equal, as required for level-1 anonymity. Upon receiving challenge ciphertext C , adversary B sends (i, R, C ) to A and runs it until A outputs a bit b (responding to A's oracle queries the same way as before). Adversary B outputs the same bit b .
It is easy to see that, due to the ordered structure of the time tree, adversary B does not need to corrupt any ancestors of its challenge identities. Therefore, adversary B succeeds whenever A does, and we have Adv
for all k ∈ N, from which the theorem follows.
Lemma 6.3 Let HIBE be a HIBE scheme, and let PETKS = hibe-2-petks(HIBE , t(k)) where t(k ) = O(log(k )). If HIBE is IBE-IND-CPA-secure, then PETKS is computationally consistent.
Proof: Let A be an adversary of the consistency of PETKS. We construct an IBE-IND-CPA adversary B of HIBE as follows.
or "yes" and 0 meaning "reject" or "no". As usual H is a random oracle whose domain and/or range might depend on k and pk . For consistency, we require that for all k ∈ N, all identities id , and all w ∈ {0, 1} * ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk , msk ) $ ← Setup(1 k ), the random choice of H, and the coins of all algorithms in the expression above.
Consistency. As we have done for other primitives, we now present formal definitions of consistency for IBEKS schemes. Let IBEKS = (Setup, KeyDer, Td, IBEKS, Test) be an IBEKS scheme. We associate to an adversary U the following experiment:
Like in the PEKS case, we say that IBEKS is perfectly consistent if this advantage is 0 for all (computationally unrestricted) adversaries U, statistically consistent if it is negligible for all (computationally unrestricted) adversaries U, and computationally consistent if it is negligible for all PTAs U. Note that this definition also considers it a consistency problem if a trapdoor for identity id tests positively for a ciphertext intended for identity id = id . This type of problems is easily avoided by having the KeyDer, Td and IBEKS algorithms include the intended identity into the user secret keys, trapdoors and ciphertexts, respectively.
Privacy. Let IBEKS = (Setup, KeyDer, Td, IBEKS, Test) be an ID-based searchable encryption scheme. To any b ∈ {0, 1} and any adversary A, we associate the following experiment:
The IBEKS-IND-CPA-advantage of an adversary A in violating the chosen-plaintext indistinguishability of the scheme IBEKS is defined as
An IBEKS scheme IBEKS is said to be IBEKS-IND-CPA-secure if this advantage is a negligible function in k for all PTAs A.
A generic transformation from anonymous HIBE schemes
We now propose a generic transformation, called hibe-2-ibeks, to convert any HIBE scheme with two levels into an IBEKS scheme. To obtain an IBEKS that is IBEKS-IND-CPA-secure, it is sufficient to start with a HIBE that is anonymous at level 2. Moreover, if the underlying HIBE is HIBE-IND-CPA[2]-secure, then the resulting IBEKS is also computationally consistent.
The hibe-2-ibeks transformation. Given a HIBE scheme HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) with two levels, hibe-2-ibeks returns the IBEKS scheme IBEKS = (Setup, KeyDer, IBEKS, Td, Test) such that KeyDer(msk , id ) = (usk , id ) where usk , (id , w ) , C 1 ), Td(usk = (usk , id ), w ) = (id , t w ) where t w $ ← KeyDer(usk , (id , w )) and Test(t w = (id , t w ), (id , C 1 , C 2 )) returns 1 iff Dec(t w , C 2 ) = C 1 and id = id . Proof: Given an adversary A breaking the IBEKS-IND-CPA-security of IBEKS, we construct an HIBE-ANO-CPA[2, 2]-adversary B breaking HIBE as follows. On input a public key pk , algorithm B runs A on the same input, answering A's Trapd(id , w ) oracle queries by querying its own KeyDer(·) oracle for the secret key corresponding to identity (id , w ). When A outputs a challenge identity id and two challenge keywords w 0 , w 1 , adversary B chooses a random message M ∈ {0, 1} k and outputs M as the challenge message and id 0 = (id , w 0 ) and id 1 = (id , w 1 ) as the challenge identities, which in fact differ only in the second entry. Let C be the challenge ciphertext that B receives at the beginning of its guess phase. Adversary B returns (M , C ) to A, and continues to run A (answering Trapd queries the same way as before) until it outputs a bit b . Algorithm B then outputs the same bit b as its own output.
It is clear from the construction that B's simulation of A's environment is perfect. Since A cannot query its Trapd oracle on keywords (id , w 0 ) and (id , w 1 ), B will not be forced to query its KeyDer on identities id 0 and id 1 , and hence wins the game whenever A does. Therefore, we have that
HIBE,B (k) , from which the theorem follows for CPA security. This proves the lemma. Proof: Let A 1 be an adversary of the consistency of IBEKS. We construct an HIBE-IND-CPA [2] adversary B 1 of HIBE as follows.
Since, by construction, Test(t w , C ) returns 0 whenever id = id , we can assume that w = w and id = id . Thus, exactly as in Theorem 4.2, we have Pr Exp hibe-ind-cpa-1 [2] HIBE,B 1
Pr Exp hibe-ind-cpa-0 [2] HIBE,B 1
Equation (10) and Equation (11) give us
HIBE,B 1
The result follows.
Concrete instantiations
Neither the GS-HIBE scheme of [12] nor the mGS-HIBE scheme of Figure 6 are anonymous at the second level. For the GS-HIBE scheme, consider an adversary A who outputs challenge identities id = (id 1 , id 2 ) and id = (id 1 , id 2 ) for any id 1 , id 2 , id 2 ∈ {0, 1} * such that id 2 = id 2 , and any challenge message M ∈ {0, 1} k . When given the challenge ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ), A checks whether e(C 1 , H 1 (id )) = e(P, C 2 ). (See Equation (7) for how ciphertexts are created in the GS-HIBE scheme.) If the test succeeds, then A returns 0, otherwise it returns 1. It is easy to see that the advantage of A is Adv hibe-ano-cpa [2, 2] GS-HIBE,A (k) ≥ 1 − 2 −k . A similar attack can be mounted on the mGS-HIBE scheme by checking whether e(C 1 , H 1,2 (id 2 )) = e(P, C 2 ). In Appendix B.3, we show that the recently introduced HIBE scheme by Boneh et al. [6] is not level-2 anonymous either (and actually, not anonymous at any level). So even though we showed how to construct IBEKS schemes from any level-2 anonymous HIBE scheme, we do not know of any schemes to instantiate it with, even in the random oracle model.
Identity-based encryption with temporary keyword search
The ideas of Sections 6 and 7 can be further combined to create an identity-based encryption scheme with temporary keyword search. This can be constructed from a level-2 anonymous HIBE scheme by putting the users' identities at the first level of the hierarchy, the keywords at the second, and a binary tree of time frames on the levels below.
Open problems
Existing constructions of (IBE-IND-CPA and) IBE-ANO-CPA IBE schemes (cf. Theorem 4.4), as well as of PEKS-IND-CPA and computationally consistent PEKS schemes [7] , are in the RO model. It would be interesting to find a construction of an (IBE-IND-CPA and) IBE-ANO-CPA IBE scheme with a proof of security in the standard model. (Theorem 4.2 then implies a PEKS-IND-CPA and computationally consistent PEKS scheme in the standard model.)
Another interesting question is to find a HIBE scheme providing anonymity at level 2, even in the RO model. By our results, such a scheme would automatically yield an IBEKS scheme.
It would be nice to come up with a searchable encryption scheme that allows for more advanced searching tools. A natural extension of the basic scheme may be, for example, a searchable encryption mechanism that allow to search for simple boolean formulas on keywords (say w 1 ∧w 2 ∨w 3 ). First steps in this direction have been taken [15, 18] by schemes that allow to search for conjunctive combinations of keywords.
[ 
A Consistency of the limited PEKS schemes
The limited constructions of [7] do not use ROs, but either allow only a polynomial number of keywords to be used, or have key sizes polynomial in the number of trapdoors issued. To treat these types of constructions, we will first extend the definitions of PEKS schemes and their consistency to allow keyword spaces.
PEKS, more generally. A map KwSp is called a keyword space if given k ∈ N it returns a subset of {0, 1} * and also there is a PTA that on input 1 k , w returns 1 if w ∈ KwSp(k) and 0 otherwise. The space has size s:
To say that a PEKS scheme has keyword space KwSp means that keywords encrypted by a sender, or for which a receiver generates a trapdoor, are in KwSp(k) when the keys are generated with security parameter k. Formally, it just means that the right keyword consistency condition of Section 2 is only required for all w ∈ KwSp(k) rather than all w ∈ {0, 1} * . Note that a PEKS scheme (as previously defined) is just one where KwSp(k) = {0, 1} * for all k ∈ N. The notion of privacy recalled in Section 2 is generalized in a natural way. Namely, the last line of the experiment becomes if {w 0 , w 1 } ∩ WSet = ∅ and w , w ∈ KwSp(k) then return b else return 0.
Our consistency definition from Section 3.2 is similarly generalized. Namely, the last line of the experiment becomes if w = w and w , w ∈ KwSp(k) and Test H (t w , C ) = 1 then return 1 else return 0.
With these changes, we can continue to use the same advantage notations and security terminoligies we had before. In the following, KwSp denotes a keyword space of size s, and for each k ∈ N we let w k [1] , . . . , w k [s(k)] denote the members of KwSp(k) in lexicographic order. For w ∈ KwSp(k) we let Ind k (w ) be the unique i such that w = w k [i]. We say that KwSp is accessible if Ind k (w ) can be computed in time poly(k, |w |).
A.1 The first limited scheme
Let KwSp be an accessible keyword space whose size s is a polynomial (in k). Let PKE = (EKG, Enc, Dec) be a standard public-key encryption scheme, specified as usual by its key-generation, encryption and decryption algorithms. The first limited construction of [7] associates to KwSp and PKE the PEKS scheme PEKS = (KG, PEKS, Td, Test) with keyword space KwSp shown in Figure 7 . Note that the fact that the algorithms of this scheme are PT relies on the assumed accessibility of the scheme. Also note that the public and secret keys have size linear in s(k), which is the limitation of the scheme.
The PEKS-IND-CPA security of the scheme is proven in [7] based on the anonymity of PKE as defined in [2] . Our concern here is the consistency. The interesting element of the following result is that based on only a computational assumption about the encryption scheme (namely that it meets the standard IND-CPA notion of privacy) we can establish statistical consistency of the PEKS scheme:
Theorem A.1 Let KwSp be an accessible keyword space whose size s is a polynomial (in k) and let PKE = (EKG, Enc, Dec) be a standard public-key encryption scheme. Let PEKS = (KG, PEKS, Td, Test) be the associated PEKS scheme with keyword space KwSp shown in Figure 7 . If PKE is IND-CPA secure then PEKS is statistically consistent.
We remark that the proof shows something stronger, namely that the assumption on PKE can be relaxed to ask that it is merely one-way.
Proof of Theorem A.1: Let U be any (computationally unrestricted) adversary attacking the consistency of PEKS. We define the PTA A attacking the IND-CPA security of PKE as follows. In its find stage, given input a public key pk , adversary A lets M 0 , M 1 be random k-bit strings, and returns these as its challenge messages. In the guess stage, given challenge ciphertext C that encrypts M b under pk , where b ∈ {0, 1} is the challenge bit, it picks random, distinct indices l, m ∈ {1, . . . , s(k)}. It sets pk [l] ← pk and for i ∈ {1, . . . , l
(We assume k can be recovered from pk . Think of pk as a public key for the PEKS scheme given as input to U, and w k 
Note we claim this is true even though A never ran or invoked U in any way. (Indeed, it cannot, since the latter may not be PT.) The assumption that PKE is IND-CPA now implies that Adv peks-consist
PEKS,U
(k) is negligible. It remains to see why Equation (12) is true. Imagine (a thought experiment) running U on input pk . Note the distribution of the latter is as given by KG(1 k ). Let w , w denote the (wlog distinct) keywords U outputs. Note the distribution of pk is independent of l, m, so U has no information about l, m and we can think of these as being chosen after w , w are output. Then the probability that w = w k [l] and w = w k [m] is at least 1/s(k) 2 . So if the challenge bit b equals 1 (i.e. C encrypts M 1 ) then the probability that A returns 1 (i.e. that M = M 1 ) is at least Adv
On the other hand if b = 0 (i.e. C encrypts M 0 ) then the probability that A returns 1 (i.e. that M = M 1 ) is at most 2 −k because in this case M is distributed independently of the randomly chosen M 1 .
A.2 The second limited scheme
The drawback of the first construction is that the size of the public and secret key grows linearly with the number of keywords s(k). In the second construction of [7] , key sizes grow logarithmically in s(k), but security is only provided if the number of trapdoor released to an adversary does not exceed the square-root of the key size. Thus, the scheme is still limited.
We start by recalling cover-free families. If S, T are sets, we say that S does not cover T if T ⊆ S. Let d, t, s be positive integers, and let F = (F i ) 1≤i≤s be a family of subsets of {1, . . . , d}. We say that family F is t-cover-free over {1, . . . , d}, if for each subset F i ∈ F and each S that is the union of at most t sets in (F 1 , . . . , F i−1 , F i , . . . , F s ), it is the case that S does not cover F i . Furthermore, we say that F is q-uniform if all subsets in the family have size q. We use the following fact [10] : there is a deterministic PTA that on input integers s, t returns q, d, F where F = (F i ) 1≤i≤s is a q-uniform t-cover-free family over {1, . . . , d}, for q = d/4t and d ≤ 16t 2 (1 + log(s/2)/ log 3). In the following we let SUB denote the resulting deterministic PTA that on input s, t, i returns F i .
Let t = t(k) be a polynomial representing an upper bound on the number of released trapdoors in the PEKS privacy experiment. Let KwSp be an accessible keyword space with s(k) ≤ 2 poly(k) . Let d(k) = 16t 2 (k)(1 + log(s(k)/2)/ log 3) and q(k) = d(k)/4t(k) . We call S w = SUB(s(k), t(k), Ind k (w )) the subset associated to keyword w. Let PKE = (EKG, Enc, Dec) be a standard public-key encryption scheme. The second limited construction of [7] associates to KwSp, t and PKE the PEKS scheme PEKS = (KG, PEKS, Td, Test) shown in Figure 8 . Note that the fact that the algorithms of this scheme are PT relies on the assumed accessibility of the scheme. Also note that the public and secret keys have size logarithmic in the keyword space size s(k) and polynomial (quadratic) in the maximal number of established trapdoors t(k), which is the limitation of the scheme. Also note that the upper bound t(k) must be known in advance as part of the input of the construction.
As long as the number of released trapdoors is upper bounded by t(k), the PEKS-IND-CPA security of the scheme is proven in [7] based on the anonymity of PKE. Again our concern here is the conistency.
Theorem A.2 Let KwSp be an accessible keyword space of size s, let t be a polynomial, and let PKE = (EKG, Enc, Dec) be a standard public-key encryption scheme. Let PEKS = (KG, PEKS, Td, Test) be the associated PEKS scheme shown in Figure 8 . If PKE is IND-CPA secure, then PEKS is computationally consistent.
Again we remark that the assumption on PKE can be relaxed to ask that it is merely one-way.
Proof of Theorem A.2: Let t, q, d be as above. Let U be any PTA attacking the consistency of PEKS. We define the PTA A attacking the IND-CPA security of PKE as follows. In its find stage, given input a public key pk , adversary A lets M 0 , M 1 be random k-bit strings, and returns these as its challenge messages. In the guess stage, given challenge ciphertext C that encrypts M b under pk , where b ∈ {0, 1} is the challenge bit, it picks a random index l ∈ {1, . . . , d(k)}. It sets pk [l] ← pk and for i ∈ {1, . .
It runs user U on input pk . The latter outputs two (wlog distinct) keywords w , w . Let S w = {s 1 , . . . , s q } and S w = {s 1 , . . . , s q } be the subsets associated with w and w , respectively. If l ∈ S w but l ∈ S w then A continues, else it aborts.
If A does not abort it lets m be such that s m = l. It sets C m ← C and for j ∈ {1, . . . , m 
The assumption that PKE is IND-CPA now implies that Adv peks-consist
PEKS,U
(k) is negligible. It remains to see why Equation (13) is true.
Since w = w and the family of sets is cover-free, S w \ S w = ∅. Note the distribution of pk is independent of l, so U has no information about l and we can think of it as being chosen after w , w are output. Then the probability that l ∈ S w \ S w is at least 1/d(k). So if the challenge bit b equals 1 (i.e. C = C m encrypts M 1 ) then the probability that A returns 1 (i.e. that R = R) is at least Adv peks-consist PEKS ,U (k)/d(k). On the other hand if b = 0 (i.e. C = C m encrypts M 0 ) then the probability that A returns 1 (i.e. that R = R) is at most 2 −k because in this case R is distributed independently of R.
A.3 A statistically consistent limited PEKS scheme
In what follows we will show that (a slight modification of) the PEKS scheme from Figure 8 is even statistically consistent when instantiated with a specific PKE scheme.
We let G be a cyclic group generator. This is a PTA that on input 1 k returns a triple (G, p, g) where G is a cyclic group of prime order p ∈ {2 k−1 , . . . , 2 k − 1} and g is a generator of G. We assume Test(t w , C ) parse t w as (sk 1 , . . . , sk q(k) ) parse C as (M, C 1 , . . . , C q(k) ) for j = 1, . . . , q(k) do parse C j as (R j , W j ) the DDH problem is hard relative to G. The algorithms of the PEKS scheme PEKS = (KG, PEKS, Td, Test) are now shown in Figure 9 . The parameters t, d, q and the algorithm SUB are as above.
Assuming the DDH problem is hard relative to G, one can prove that the scheme provides privacy against adversaries that query at most t(k) trapdoors. Our interest is the consistency.
Theorem A.3 The PEKS scheme of Figure 9 is statistically consistent.
Note that the consistency statement is uncondicional, i.e. it does not rely on the decisional DiffieHellman assumption.
Proof: Let U be an adversary that gets input a pair (pk , sk ) of matching public and secret keys, and outputs (wlog distinct) keywords w , w . Let C = (M, C 1 , . . . , C q ) be formed by encrypting w , and let M be as defined by Test(t w , C). The advantage of U is the probability that M = M .
Let S w = {s 1 , . . . , s q(k) } and S w = {s 1 , . . . , s q(k) } be the subsets associated with w and w , respectively. We consider two cases. The first case is that there is some l such that s l = s l but sk [s l ] = sk [s l ]. This happens with negligible probability (specifically at most d(k) 2 /p ≤ O(d(k) 2 2 −k )) since sk is a sequence of random elements of Z p . The second case is that this does not happen, meaning that for all l, if s l = s l then sk [s l ] = sk [s l ]. In this case we show that the probability that M = M is 1/p ≤ O(2 −k ) for each fixed choice of (pk , sk ) and w , w , the probability only over the coins of the encryption algorithm. where the probability is taken over the random choices of r[s j ] only. By cover-freeness, there is at least one l for which s l = s l , and since we are in the second case, sk [s l ] = sk [s l ]. Thus the probability over r[s l ] that the above equation holds is 1/p.
; E ← e(P, Q) pk ← (G 1 , G 2 , p, e, P, P 1 , U , E) ; msk ← (pk , Q 1 ) return (pk , msk ) KeyDer(msk , id ) parse msk as ((G 1 , G 2 , p, e, P, P 1 , U , E), Q 1 ) r
Enc(pk , id , M ) parse pk as (G 1 , G 2 , p, e, P, We now describe a PTA A against the IBE-ANO-CPA-security of W -IBE . In the find stage it gets input a public key (G 1 , G 2 , p, e, P, P 1 , U , E), and returns any two distinct n-bit strings id 0 , id 1 as challenge identities, along with any k-bit challenge message. In the guess phase, given a challenge ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , 
B.2 Boneh-Boyen's IBE scheme
The IBE scheme by Boneh and Boyen [5] , here referred to as BB-IBE, is depicted in Figure 11 . An identity is represented by a vector of n(k) symbols id [1 . . . n] ∈ Σ n where Σ is an alphabet of size s. In the original scheme, these are obtained as the output of an admissible hash function, but we ignore this here as it is irrelevant to the attack.
Consider a PTA A that, on input pk = (G 1 , G 2 , p, e, P, P 1 , Q, U ), outputs any two distinct identities id 0 , id 1 ∈ Σ n , and any message M ∈ {0, 1} k . Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be an index so that id 0 [i] = id 1 [i]. When A is given the challenge ciphertext C = (C 1 , . . . , C n+2 ), it checks whether e(C 2 , U [i, id 0 [i]]) = e(P, C i+2 ). If so, then A returns 0, else it returns 1. It is easily verified that Adv ibe-ano-cpa BB-IBE,A (k) ≥ 1−2 −k .
B.3 Boneh-Boyen-Goh's HIBE scheme
The recently proposed BBG-HIBE scheme [6] , depicted in Figure 12 , is not anonymous at any single level, and therefore not at any set of multiple levels either. This can be seen from the following adver- . Given that ¬Ask i−1 and that B's simulation didn't abort, the simulated public key, the oracle responses and the first l components of the ciphertext provided by B are distributed exactly as in a real attack, as we explained before. Moreover, since A did not query for H 2 (D) yet, from A's point of view the last ciphertext component C * l+1 is a random string in {0, 1} n , both in the real attack and in the simulated environment. Since all the information on which A can base its decision for its next H 2 query is identically distributed in both environments, the probability that A chooses to query D is the same in both environments as well. Hence 
